The Clean Power Plan: Testing the Limits of Administrative Law and the Electric Grid

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The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA’s”) Clean Power Plan (“CPP”) is one of the most controversial and highest-stake rules ever issued by any agency.1 Released in final form on August 4, 2015,2 the rule is aimed at existing electric power plants and establishes carbon dioxide emission reduction requirements for states. EPA projects that if each state meets its target, emissions would be about twenty percent less than 2012 levels by 2030.3 Proponents of the rule maintain that it is essential to mitigating the potentially devastating effects of climate change.4 Opponents, by contrast, argue that it is unlikely to be effective for its intended purpose and that it jeopardizes the reliability of the electricity grid and the wellbeing of the U.S. economy.5 We are in the awkward position of agreeing with both the proponents and the opponents of the CPP. We want the rule to succeed in accomplishing its intended purpose but fear it may have serious unintended adverse effects on the performance of the U.S. electricity grid and the economics of the power sector. Further, we have serious concerns about the ability of administrative law doctrine to manage the litigation that is to come.6

To frame our discussion, we offer a few observations on the scope of the Agency action at issue.7 The CPP has been the subject of intense study and controversy since its proposal in 2014. After eliciting 4.3 million comments, EPA published the final rule along with a statement of basis and purpose that is over 1500 pages long.8 The Agency’s accompanying regulatory impact analysis, technical support, and legal documents span nearly 1000 more.9 The many controversial substan-

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1. There are arguably several metrics along which the CPP might qualify: impact on utilities (compliance costs from $1.4–$8.4 billion annually); climate benefits ($20 billion by 2030); or expansive interpretation of statutory authority. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA-452/R-15-003, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Clean Power Plan Final Rule at ES-9 to ES-10, ES-20 (Aug. 2015) (presenting these figures, additional data, and assumptions). A coal-industry funded study, by contrast, puts the annual energy sector costs at $29–$39 billion and estimates costs to the U.S. economy ranging from $64–$79 billion from 2022–2033. NERA Econ. Consulting, Energy and Consumer Impacts of EPA’s Clean Power Plan 5 (2015). On the final point regarding statutory authority, see infra for our argument that EPA has jurisdictional authority to issue the CPP.


3. This is a projection, not a requirement. Further, the widely reported “requirement” of a thirty-two percent reduction below 2005 levels is based on the same projection but extrapolated to 2005 because 2005 is the year of reference for many of the United States’ international commitments. See Nathan Richardson, 2005 v. 2012 in EPA’s Proposal, Resources for the Future (June 4, 2014), http://common-resources.org/blog/2014/2005-vs-2012-epa-proposal (explaining common misconceptions regarding the requirements and dates).


6. Cf. Emergency Petition for Extraordinary Writ, In re West Virginia, No. 15-1277 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 13, 2015) (seeking emergency stay of CPP prior to rule’s publication in Federal Register); In re Murray Energy, 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (denying petition for writ of prohibition to stop EPA from issuing final rule). As this Article was going to print, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the CPP pending litigation in the D.C. Circuit. North Dakota v. EPA, No. 15A793 (U.S. Feb. 9, 2016). As we discuss infra Part II.C., the stay has significant consequences.

7. See also infra Part I (describing major attributes of CPP).


tive decisions and policy decisions embodied in the CPP are matched only by the intense debate whether the supporting legal bases are lawful. For example, the CPP unapologetically picks winners and losers among electricity fuels; most prominently, it favors natural gas and renewables over coal. This choice—which targets the largest source of baseload power in the United States—has attracted fierce opposition from the coal industry and legislators from coal states such as West Virginia, Kentucky, Wyoming, and North Dakota. On the other hand, states that have already taken significant steps toward reducing coal-fired power and increasing the use of natural gas and renewables—like California—are on track for compliance without needing to make any major changes.

From a legal standpoint, most of the arguments center on whether EPA has jurisdiction to promulgate the CPP. The Agency's basis is section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”). As we briefly discuss below, two competing versions of that section are published in the Statutes at Large, and they point in opposite jurisdictional directions. Moreover, whether EPA may regulate "beyond the fence-line" of individual power plants and focus on the electricity system as a whole is a hotly contested matter of statutory interpretation. Other issues include whether the many interstitial interpretive and policymaking decisions within the CPP would survive judicial scrutiny. And the legality of EPA's simultaneously issued regulations for new and modified power plants, which are a legal predicate to the CPP itself, are also a matter of debate.

The purpose of this Article is not simply to repeat the already well-developed, rigorous debate that adheres to each policy and legal choice embodied in the CPP. Rather, we discuss four issues that are raised by the CPP but that have not yet attracted the attention and analysis they deserve. After summarizing the main elements of the CPP, we consider: (1) the administrative law issues related to whether and to what extent reviewing courts should defer to the EPA's two statutory interpretations that provide the jurisdictional basis for the CPP; (2) what remedy a court should provide at various procedural postures if it detects or believes likely a fatal error in the CPP or the process through which it was issued; (3) the implementation challenges associated with the intermittent nature of the electricity supplies that EPA expects utilities to substitute for the fossil fuels that now provide most of the nation's electricity; and (4) the implementation challenges associated with the risk that some of the most promising approaches for state compliance may be preempted by the Federal Power Act (“FPA”). The first two issues are not unique to the CPP. These issues create serious problems whenever a court is called upon to review a major agency rule, but they are particularly pronounced with respect to the CPP. The third and fourth issues are among the most serious obstacles to successfully implementing the CPP.

I. A Brief Overview of the Clean Power Plan

It is now broadly accepted that the world is experiencing major changes in climate, the causes of these changes are anthropogenic greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions, and, unmitigated, these changes will be catastrophic for billions of people, human health, and the environment. Indeed, climate effects are already observable and inevitable, but mitigating these effects by reducing GHG emissions is a critical component of both domestic and international climate policy. Greenhouse gases include several compounds; carbon dioxide (“CO₂”) is the focus of the CPP. Any electricity source that burns fossil fuels emits CO₂; the amount of emissions is a function of the efficiency of the combustion process and the amount of carbon in the fuel source. Further, there is not at present any economically viable technology-based method (such as a scrubber for example) of reducing emissions of CO₂ from combustion of any carbon-based fuel at existing sources. Thus, the only currently viable way to reduce GHG emissions from fossil-fueled power—which accounts for over thirty-eight percent of U.S. GHG emissions—is to improve efficiency or switch fuels to lower- or

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21. Id. at 66,514. Some of the considerations we raise in Part III.A, infra, are also relevant to adaptation to the extent they relate to grid resiliency.
23. EPA explains that CO₂ accounts for eighty-two percent of U.S. GHG emissions.
25. See CPP, supra note 2, at 64,690 (“CO₂’s huge quantities and lack of reactivity make it challenging to remove from a smokestack.”).
26. Id. at 134.
Through complicated in its details, we can summarize the features of the CPP that are important for our purposes. The rule relies on the cooperative federalism structure familiar to major federal environmental statutes. Once EPA sets new source performance standards for a given pollutant found to endanger public health or welfare under section 111(b) of the CAA, states are required to develop implementation plans to reduce emissions of that pollutant from existing sources under section 111(d). The CPP fits into this scheme by providing the emission guidelines and “best system of emissions reduction” (“BSER”) that states must meet in their plans. EPA gives states considerable flexibility with respect to their methods of implementation. Thus, they may adopt source-specific requirements, engage in coordinated efforts with other states, develop mass-based trading programs, and/or incorporate other state policy measures, like conservation and efficiency, into their approaches.

EPA’s methodology and assumptions in setting the state goals and BSER are of particular interest for purposes of our analysis below. BSER consists of three building blocks. The first block assumes heat efficiency improvements at coal-fired electric generating units (“EGUs”) in the 2.1% to 4.3% range. The second block relies on fuel switching by EGUs from coal to natural gas combined cycle (“NGCC”) units, which are the most efficient of natural gas units and emit slightly more than one-third of the CO₂ of conventional coal-fired units on a mass-per-MW.h basis. The third building block relies on fuel-switching by EGUs from fossil fuels to new zero-emitting renewable generation—primarily wind and solar. After calculating BSER reductions on a regional basis, EPA applied those expectations to each state’s electric generating units (“EGUs”) in the 2.1% to 4.3% range. Each state then was expected to incorporate other state policy measures, like conservation and efficiency, into their approaches.

I. Administrative Law and the Clean Power Plan

Judicial review of the CPP is already underway. Thus far, the D.C. Circuit has denied multiple requests for stays, but in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court has taken the extraordinarily unusual step of issuing a stay during the pendency of the litigation. And although neither court has yet considered the merits of the CPP, the dispute is so important—already attracting the High Court’s attention—that the Court is virtually certain to play a role in the review process. Of course, judicial review is an ordinary feature of major rulemakings. A typology of potential defects is set out in the CAA itself and parallels the scope-of-review provisions in section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). We expect the petitioners to make the two most frequent objections to the legality of any rule: (1) that it is in excess of statutory jurisdiction; and that it is (2) arbitrary and capricious because the Agency did not explain adequately (a) its critical policy choices underlying the rule; and/or (b) its responses to comments that raised well-supported questions about the practicality and wisdom of the rule. In Sections A and B below, we offer our observations only with respect to the largest issues involving statutory jurisdiction. In Section C below, we consider remedies as the issue relates to both statutory authority and the arbitrary and capricious standard.

First, however, we note that the wisdom of the administrative law doctrine surrounding these grounds for judicial review has been called into question, and the argument is explicitly articulated in an amicus brief submitted by the Environmental Defense Fund.

28. Id. at 64,512–13. As an alternative, the agency will permit co-firing with natural gas. Id. at 64,513. Further, EPA suggests that market conditions are such that coal-fired plants are unlikely to be built in the future, but if they are, the New Source Performance Standards will encourage research and development of CCS. Id. at 64,513–14. Overall, the agency appears to go out of its way to provide alternatives to CCS in light of the limited current use, its expense, the geological needs of the technology, and its potential water-use and water-quality implications. E.g., id. at 64,539, 64,541.
29. Id. at 64,539, 64,541.
30. See CPP, supra note 2, at 64,669–74. We discuss the issues surrounding BSER infra Part II.B.
31. E.g., CPP, supra note 2, at 64,672–74.
32. Id. at 64,789.
34. CPP, supra note 2, at 64,807 (also listing geothermal and hydropower).
35. Id. at 64,667.
36. Id.
38. North Dakota v. EPA, No. 15A793 (U.S. Feb. 9, 2016) (extending stay through Court's review upon grant of certiorari); see discussion supra Part II.C.1.
42. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C); see generally 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE ch. 3 (5th ed. 2010).
44. See generally PIERCE, supra note 42, at 593–94.
reversal is the subject of enduring debates. There is evidence that agencies have so internalized the court-imposed requirements of administrative law doctrine\textsuperscript{45} that—depending on whom one asks—agencies are either hopelessly ossified\textsuperscript{46} or demonstrably democratic.\textsuperscript{47} Layered over these concerns is a broader challenge of administrative law—managing the reliance interests of regulated parties and statutory beneficiaries while accommodating separation-of-powers concerns. Any time an agency issues a rule that requires major changes of the regulated community, that community is faced with potentially enormous expenditures. If regulated entities undertake those expenditures while a rule is being challenged, what are they to do if the rule is ultimately vacated? And if they do not undertake those expenditures, what of the public benefits that were not realized before the rule was ultimately upheld? Whether or not (or whenever) a court intervenes, it will also be mindful of its place in the constitutional structure—both ensuring the agency stays within its jurisdictional boundaries and deferring to the agency’s expertise and place within the executive branch.

Second, we emphasize that we do not attempt to set forth all the legal arguments that will surely be briefed, nor is our focus on the debate regarding the wisdom of administrative law doctrine. Instead, we argue that the CPP strains the limits of administrative law itself. This concern is best illustrated by two issues: judicial review of EPA’s interpretation of the CAA; and the relationship between procedural postures, remedies, and reliance.

A. Statutory Authority for the CPP

There are two critical interpretive issues related to EPA’s statutory authority to promulgate the CPP. The first—commonly called the section 112 exemption issue—relates to EPA’s authority to regulate GHGs from EGUs at all. The second—commonly called the beyond-the-fence-line issue—relates to how EPA determines what constitutes BSER (which is the premise upon which the entire CPP is based). This Section briefly reviews the issues before considering the applicable administrative law.

First, EPA’s authority for the CPP comes from section 111(d) of the CAA. This provision contemplates emission standards for existing sources, and cross-references section 112. Section 112 governs air toxics, and the cross-reference creates an exclusion from regulation under section 111(d).\textsuperscript{48} What exactly constitutes the exclusion is unclear because when Congress amended section 111 in 1990, it made a serious error. It enacted two different versions of the exclusion. The House version of the amendment seems to preclude any regulation of a source category under section 111(d) if EPA already regulates that source category under section 112.\textsuperscript{49} The Senate version, by contrast, appears to exclude from section 111(d)’s reach only pollutants already regulated under section 112.\textsuperscript{50} In 1995, when EPA first had occasion to consider this discrepancy, it concluded that it was required to give effect to the House version and could not regulate sources already regulated under section 112.\textsuperscript{51} In the statement of basis and purpose of the CPP, however, EPA decided that its prior interpretation of the section 112 exclusion was wrong.\textsuperscript{52} The Agency concluded that the House version is ambiguous, and the best resolution of the two versions is that “the [section 112 Exclusion does not bar the regulation under [section 111(d)] of non-HAP [(non-hazardous air pollutants)] from a source category, regardless of whether that source category is subject to standards for HAP under CAA section 112.”\textsuperscript{53} Parties that challenge the validity of the CPP will argue EPA’s initial interpretation of section 112 was correct and that its new interpretation is erroneous.

The next statutory argument petitioners will make is that the second and third building blocks of the CPP are beyond EPA’s power to implement section 111(d). As mentioned above, section 111(d) provides that EPA must issue regulations under which states establish “standards of performance.”\textsuperscript{54} That phrase is defined as:

[A] standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and any nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy requirements) the Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated.\textsuperscript{55}

The key legal argument here is that the massive fuel switching envisioned by the CPP does not qualify as a “standard.” Traditionally, EPA has established technology-based stan-

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47. Hammond & Markell, supra note 28, at 355.
49. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 108(g), 104 Stat. 2399, 2467. At the time the CPP was promulgated, EPA regulated EGUs’ toxic air emissions under section 112 (the “MATS rule”). Although the Supreme Court held unreasonable EPA’s interpretation of section 112 as precluding cost considerations in deciding whether to regulate, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015), the rule had not been stayed pending litigation. The D.C. Circuit has not yet determined whether to remand with vacatur, but SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943), ought to require any analysis be based on the agency’s reasoning at the time it made its decision; here, the CPP was predicated on the MATS rule’s presence. See also Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2710 (insisting on adhering to Chenery I notwithstanding presence of other cost-benefit information in the record). Thus, even if the D.C. Circuit vacates the MATS rule, that decision ought not moot the section 112 exclusion issue here. See also CPP, supra note 2, at 64-697 (“[T]he MATS rule remains in place at this time.”).
50. § 302(a), 104 Stat. at 2574.
52. CPP, supra note 2, at 64,710–11.
53. Id. at 64,711.
55. Id. § 7411(a)(1) (emphasis added).
56. Petitioners might also contend that EPA failed to adequately consider the factors listed in the definition’s parenthetical, perhaps for some of the reasons we discuss in Part III, infra.
dards that require emission reductions at individual sources. EPA's new source performance standards for CO₂ illustrate that approach. The Agency set an emission rate for CO₂ at new coal-fired power plants, and then it attempted to support the standard by referencing technologies and operational changes that could be used to achieve those standards. The first building block of the CPP is a variant of this type of traditional standard—it requires coal-fired EGUs to improve their efficiency to achieve fewer emissions. But the much larger second and third blocks of the CPP go “beyond the fence-line” of a single plant and therefore arguably are not “standards” within the meaning of the CAA. In other words, petitioners will argue that EPA lacks the statutory authority to use building blocks 2 and 3 as BSER.

B. Judicial Review of EPA's Jurisdictional Interpretations

When courts review agencies' interpretations of statutes they administer, the typical analytical framework is that set forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Chevron, of course, traditionally involves a two-step analysis that asks first whether Congress has directly spoken; if not, the statute is ambiguous and courts should defer to an agency's permissible interpretation. Notably, Chevron extends to an agency's interpretation of the scope of its own jurisdiction; it is not limited to smaller interpretive questions involving how the agency applies its authority. Under the holding of National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, if a court reviewing an agency's interpretation determines that the statute has a clear meaning, the agency is not free on remand to depart from that determination. But if a court determines that the statute is ambiguous, the agency is free to later adopt a different interpretation provided that interpretation is permissible. Moreover, there is no heightened standard of review when an agency makes such a change.

In explaining its rationale for how it reconciled the competing versions of section 111(d), EPA did not explicitly walk through a Chevron analysis, relying instead on traditional means of statutory interpretation such as considering the language of the provisions, the legislative history, the purpose of the statute, and the like. EPA's discussion of BSER similarly does not explicitly reference Chevron, but it follows Chevron's logic. For example, it notes that BSER is undefined, “broad and capacious,” and it emphasizes that Congress gave EPA interpretive authority to determine BSER—considerations familiar to Chevron step one. The Agency next argues the interpretation is reasonable and consistent with the purpose and legislative history of the CAA as well as with the “structure and economics of the utility power sector.

Notwithstanding the Chevron paradigm that features so strongly in this and other administrative law discussions, we highlight here what neither side has explicitly engaged, but what we expect is a driving concern—the bigger-picture issue of regulatory stability lurking behind Chevron. To demonstrate, we will briefly sketch how Chevron might apply to each issue and what the long-term ramifications might be.

Turning first to the section 112 exclusion issue, it seems unlikely that EPA would succeed at step one by arguing that the statute is clear, given its prior opposite interpretation of the exclusion. Given the inconsistency of the two versions of section 112 and EPA's inconsistent interpretations of that section, it would be hard for a court to support a conclusion that Congress “directly spoke to the issue.” Thus, if a court applies Chevron, it should hold that Congress did not resolve the issue and, hence, it must uphold the EPA interpretation if it is reasonable.

Second, whether Congress directly spoke to the beyond-the-fence-line issue, is a question that could be answered intellectually honestly in support of either clear language or ambiguity. That outcome likely depends on a reviewing court's choice of the many approaches to step one, the variety and merits of which we do not endeavor to survey here. But by way of example, dictionary definitions have figured prominently in judicial analyses at step one, and definitions here point in opposing directions. One definition of “standard,” for example, supports a plain meaning akin to what EPA has done in the past: “a level of quality achievement, etc. that is considered acceptable or desirable,” for example, “something set up and established by authority as a rule for the measure of quantity, weight, extent, value, or quality.” These concepts do not seem to fit with massive fuel switching, and EPA has

57. See generally NSPS, supra note 17.
58. While do not here elaborate our concerns that the New Source Performance Standards are arbitrary and capricious.
60. The two-step framework provides that courts must ask first whether Congress has directly spoken; if not, the statute is ambiguous and courts should defer to an agency’s permissible interpretation.
61. Id. at 842–43.
64. Id. at 982.
65. Id. at 981–82.
67. In a footnote, the Agency makes such a change.
68. See Emily Hammond et al., Judicial Review of Statutory Issues Under the Chevron Doctrine, in A Guide to Judicial and Political Review of Federal Agen-
never before understood its statutory mandate in that way. On the other hand, “system” might permit the fuel-switching approach. “System” means “a group of related parts that move or work together,” e.g., “a regularly interacting or interdependent group of items forming a unified system.” EPA reasons that “system” works well for the U.S. electricity grid, which it accurately describes as an interdependent and interconnected group of EGUs that must function as a whole. EPA also argues persuasively that it must rely primarily on mandatory fuel-switching by the interdependent group of EGUs that comprise the grid to achieve significant emissions reductions because CO₂ is unique as a pollutant; it cannot be reduced significantly with traditional pollution-control devices. Thus, if EPA cannot require fuel-switching it has no means of mitigating climate change caused by EGUs—notwithstanding its prior determination that GHG emissions endanger public health. These latter arguments help demonstrate that EPA’s interpretation of BSER is permissible and not foreclosed by the clear language of the statute. But for either of these statutory issues—whether the section 112 exemption or the beyond-the-fence-line argument—a court’s reaching step two would create a strange situation. A new EPA Administrator appointed by a President who does not share President Obama’s enthusiasm for the CPP’s approach could adopt the opposite interpretation, and a reviewing court would be required to uphold those interpretations as long as they are permissible under the reason adopted in Brand X. Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphasized that an agency can adopt an interpretation of a statute it implements that is inconsistent with its prior interpretation without providing any heightened explanation that the new interpretation is better than the old interpretation. An agency needs only to establish that the new interpretation is permissible. In other words, the ordinary step two analysis applies—and we would expect agencies’ win rates at step two to be quite high.


76. Standard, supra note 74.

77. CPP, supra note 2, at 64,677–78.

78. Id. at 64,690.

79. See Coal. for Responsible Reg. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d in part on other grounds, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) (upholding endan-
germent finding).

80. Once again, this brief discussion provides only a small summary of the analysis supporting a determination that EPA’s interpretation is permissible. Cf. CPP, supra note 2, at 64,718 (presenting EPA’s full analysis).


83. Id. at 515.

84. Studies of affmative rates under the Chevron doctrine show agency win rates ranging from about sixty-four percent to about eighty-one percent. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 Admin L. Rev. 77, 84 (2011) (collecting studies and noting slight decrease in win rates over time); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpreta-
tions From Chevron to Hamdan, 36 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1129 (2008) (finding Chevron win rate at over seventy-six percent, but win rate regardless of defer-
ence regime at about sixty-eight percent). These studies do not necessarily dis-

85. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1017 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

86. See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Future of Deference, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (forthcoming Sept. 2016) (criticizing Brand X for creating regula-
tory uncertainty).

state Rule); see also Emily Hammond Meazell, supra note 8 (collecting other examples of agencies’ changed policies over courses of repeated judicial review). On the air toxics issue, some of the history is recounted in White Stallion En-

88. The presidential control model of administrative law presumably would view executive direction as a legitimizing force to counteract our arguments here. E.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245 (2001); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbi-
terary and Capri-
tious Review, 119 Yale L.J. 2 (2009); cf. Emily Hammond Meazell, Presiden-
it is applied in circumstances like these, where the authority of the EPA to act at all is under question.\textsuperscript{90}

For the CPP, therefore, a reviewing court might take a cue from the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in \textit{King v. Burwell}.\textsuperscript{91} The Court had to decide whether a critical provision of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)\textsuperscript{92} had a meaning that was consistent with the purposes of the ACA or had a meaning that would make it virtually impossible to continue to implement the ACA.\textsuperscript{93} The provision was so poorly crafted that it is easy to understand why the three dissenting Justices concluded that it clearly required a course of action that would erode political support for the ACA by depriving the citizens of thirty-one states from access to one of the most valuable benefits provided by the Act.\textsuperscript{94}

A six-Justice majority believed that the provision at issue was ambiguous.\textsuperscript{95} Yet—after acknowledging that normally such a situation would point to \textit{Chevron} deference to the Internal Revenue Service’s (“IRS’s”) interpretation—the majority declined to apply that approach.\textsuperscript{96} Why? The Court explained that \textit{Chevron} is premised on an implicit delegation of interpretive authority to the relevant agency, but “[i]n extraordinary cases, . . . there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation.”\textsuperscript{97} The Court reasoned that the “deep economic and political significance” of the issue was so important that it was not willing to attribute to Congress an intent to allow the Agency to adopt its own interpretation of the provision.\textsuperscript{98} This was particularly true because the IRS did not have expertise in health care policy.\textsuperscript{99}

\textit{King} was an excellent candidate for the Court’s refusal to accord deference to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term. The ACA is controversial and has been the subject of partisan acrimony. Whether you like or dislike the ACA, it is hard to believe anyone would favor the chaotic situation that would exist if one of the core provisions of the ACA was effective only half of the time, depending on the results of each presidential election. And for those ascribing to the implicit delegation rationale of \textit{Chevron},\textsuperscript{100} the IRS’s interpretive role seems far removed from typical \textit{Chevron} cases in which there is no doubt about the interpreting agency’s expertise.\textsuperscript{101}

The pending litigation to review the legality of the CPP is at least as strong a candidate for that treatment. To see why, it is important to note that the Court has identified several types of cases in which \textit{Chevron} will not apply. \textit{King} illustrated two—both the significance of the ACA\textsuperscript{102} and the IRS’s lack of expertise\textsuperscript{103} supported the Court’s approach. Other examples include situations where more than one agency administers the statute in question,\textsuperscript{104} and where the agency used procedures that were less democratic than those in notice-and-comment rulemaking or the APA’s formal methods.\textsuperscript{105} Ultimately, these categories are born of analyses that ask whether Congress intended to delegate the interpretive authority to the agency.\textsuperscript{106} With respect to the section 112 exemption issue, it seems very difficult to attribute an intent to delegate by a Congress that did not reach agreement on the language it passed. Because of this unique set of facts, moreover, it is not a material point of distinction that EPA here has expertise with respect to the CAA (unlike the IRS in \textit{King}). Furthermore, the significance of the CPP is enormous, both politically and economically.\textsuperscript{107} No one would gain from a situation in which firms are strongly encouraged to make investments in long-lived assets and then see the value of those investments dissipate dramatically a few years later due to changes in political control.

A difficulty with this approach is its indeterminacy—how ought a court decide whether an interpretive issue is sufficiently “important” to take it out of the \textit{Chevron} framework? Granting the problematic nature of such an inquiry, we think that the scope of the CPP is such that it is not a case on the margins. Perhaps because of such indeterminacy difficulties, we also note that the Court frequently ducks the \textit{Chevron} issue altogether, applying its own statutory interpretation rather than \textit{Chevron} even when an issue fits the

\textsuperscript{90} Where to draw the line between types of interpretive issues is a challenging question. We ourselves have somewhat differing views. Compare Pierce, supra note 86 (arguing against \textit{Brand X} generally); with Emily Hammond, \textit{Chevron’s Generality Principles}, 83 FORD. L. REV. 655, 657 (2014) (arguing there is “nothing inherently illegitimate in an agency’s revising its interpretation”). Merely describing some issues as jurisdictional and others as interstitial is unsatisfying because, as Justice Scalia explained in \textit{City of Arlington v. FCC}, ultimately any interpretive question relates to the agency’s statutory authority. See \textit{City of Arlington v. FCC}, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013) (“No matter how it is framed, the question a court faces when confronted with an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers is always, simply, whether the agency has stayed within the bounds of its statutory authority.”).


\textsuperscript{93} See \textit{King}, 135 S. Ct. at 2492–93 (describing interpretations).

\textsuperscript{94} See id. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Id.} at 2492 (majority opinion). Among other things, it considered other provisions of the ACA that were obviously inconsistent with the language of the provision at issue and evidence of congressional purpose in reaching this determination. \textit{Id.} at 2489–92.

\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Id.} at 2488–89.

\textsuperscript{97} \textit{Id.} (citing \textit{FCA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.}, 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)).

\textsuperscript{98} \textit{Id.} at 2489 (citing \textit{Unil. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA}, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)). The majority then relied primarily on the policies underlying the ACA to support its own interpretation of the provision, which fit well with the purpose of the statute. \textit{Id.} at 2491–98.

\textsuperscript{99} \textit{Id.} at 2489.

\textsuperscript{100} The Court itself frequently uses such language. \textit{E.g.}, \textit{id. at 2488} (citing \textit{Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.}, 529 U.S. at 159); \textit{United States v. Mead Corp.}, 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001). A variety of scholars also espouse this view. \textit{E.g.}, Kent Barnett, \textit{Codifying Chevron}, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 6–7, 35 (2015) (arguing in support of delegation theory). The numerous potential rationales for \textit{Chevron} are collected in numerous places; at least one of us does not necessarily think the delegation rationale is particularly compelling. Cf. Mark Seidenfeld, \textit{Chevron’s Foundation}, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 277–88 (2011) (criticizing intent-based rationales).

\textsuperscript{101} See Emily Hammond Meazell, supra note 89, at 1771–74, 1803–04 (describing relevance of expertise in determining whether deference is appropriate).

\textsuperscript{102} See also \textit{Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.}, 529 U.S. at 133 (“[W]e must be guided to a degree by common sense as to the manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such economic and political magnitude to an administrative agency.”).


\textsuperscript{104} \textit{E.g.}, Metro. Stovender Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137 n.9 (1997) (APA).

\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Mead Corp.}, 533 U.S. at 226–27, 230.

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{E.g.}, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015).

\textsuperscript{107} See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
Chevron prerequisites. We think the better approach is the direct one; the Court should explain why Chevron is not applicable and use EPA’s well-reasoned analysis to reach a favorable jurisdictional decision that cannot be disturbed by shifting political whims.

This discussion raises the question whether a King approach should be used for both the section 112 exemption and the beyond-the-fence-line issues. On one hand, the former issue is a better candidate for King treatment from a delegation perspective because of the perplexing matter of two different statutory amendments in addition to its importance politically and economically. Moreover, it is aimed at EPA’s authority to regulate GHGs from existing EGU’s at all, such that shifting interpretations over time would most disturb regulatory stability. The latter issue might not be so compelling because it does not share the unusual statutory background and is of second-order jurisdictional importance. On the other hand, the latter issue is certainly jurisdictional—it provides the predicate to EPA’s approach to the CPP—and the Supreme Court has instructed that it does not matter for deference regimes what type of jurisdictional question is at issue. Furthermore, EPA’s interpretation of BSER here provides the entire foundation of the CPP (thus carrying the same political and economic significance); a new interpretation in 2017 would certainly disturb regulatory stability.

But even if King were not applied to the fence-line issue, we argue that two other recent decisions—both involving EPA—point to what might be called “Brand X avoidance” and may have particular applicability. As noted above, Justice Scalia has been a strong critic of Brand X, and his approach to Chevron has set clear boundaries on Brand X’s applicability. In the face of ambiguous statutory terms, he has sometimes concluded that EPA’s interpretation is clearly foreclosed. The impact of that approach is best illustrated by two cases. First, in Michigan v. EPA, Justice Scalia (writing for the majority) reasoned that EPA’s interpretation of another provision of the CAA to preclude cost considerations was clearly beyond the bounds of the statute. This unusually strong version of step two makes it a practical impossibility for EPA ever to adopt an interpretation that does not consider cost—notwithstanding the usual Brand X norm that would permit flexibility in interpreting ambiguous statutory terms.

Second, in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, Justice Scalia (again writing for the majority) reasoned that EPA’s interpretation of yet another provision of the CAA was foreclosed by the statute. There, EPA interpreted the provision “any air pollutant” to include GHG emissions for purposes of the prevention of significant deterioration (“PSD”) program. The Court reasoned that this language was not unambiguous, but rather context-specific; and in this particular context EPA’s interpretation was foreclosed because it would “overthrow” the statutory design. Because GHGs are emitted at levels far greater than traditional pollutants, PSD regulation would swamp EPA, overwhelm state regulators, and impose billions of dollars in costs on both regulated sources and agencies. This result would be contrary to the statutory design, because Congress clearly intended the PSD provisions to apply only to “major” sources. Perhaps even more salient to the CPP, the Court emphasized that EPA’s interpretation was unreasonable because the Agency was “laying claim to extravagant statutory power over the national economy” without clear congressional authorization.

It is easy to imagine Justice Scalia writing a similar opinion in reviewing the CPP that uses a similar approach to support a holding that no interpretation of section 111(d) that authorizes EPA to regulate “beyond the fence-line” can be reasonable. However, it would be difficult for a court to resolve the interpretative issues raised by the section 112 exclusion through use of that method. The court would have to conclude either that no interpretation of any ambiguous statutory language could reasonably allow EPA to regulate GHG emissions from EGUs or that no interpretation of any ambiguous statutory language could reasonably prohibit EPA from regulating GHG emissions from EGUs. Any opinion that attempted to support either of those extreme propositions would seem disingenuous and, thus, probably motivated by the personal beliefs of the judges or Justices.

C. Remedies

As mentioned above, the Supreme Court granted a stay of the CPP pending the outcome of both the D.C. Circuit’s and the Court’s own proceedings in a 5-4 decision devoid of analy-

108. E.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527–28 (2007) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) for generalized agency discretion but failing to apply that framework and concluding that statutory text forecloses agency’s interpretation); id. at 553 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The court nowhere explains why this interpretation is incorrect, let alone why it is not entitled to deference under Chevron . . . .”); see also Eskridge & Bae, supra note 84, at 1117–18 (describing large number of cases in which Court applied no deference regime at all).

109. That is, section 111(d) is meant to ensure there are no regulatory gaps for particular pollutants; while BSER, as interpreted by EPA, is perhaps the only way to address GHG emissions from EGUs, making it the best interpretation consistent with the CAA’s mandate to regulate pollutants found to endanger the public health and welfare. GHGs, of course, already fit the endangerment criterion. Admittedly, it is plausible that a court might adopt either of the competing interpretations for each issue discussed above. Leaving our own views aside, it must be emphasized that this approach would at least promote regulatory certainty.


111. One of us would be reluctant to extend this rationale even further to other non-predicate interpretations within the CPP; the other more willing. See Pierce, supra note 86.


113. Id. at 2707. In fact, all nine Justices appear to agree on this point. See id. at 2714 (Kagan, J., dissenting).


115. Id. at 2439. The following analysis relates to the Court’s consideration of sources that are not otherwise regulated under the PSD program. See id. at 2447 (describing distinction from “anyway” sources).

116. Id. at 2442.

117. Id.

118. Id. at 2442–43.

119. Id. at 2443.

120. Id. at 2444. Nor did EPA’s Tailoring rule save its construction, because that rule departed from the clear statutory text. Id. at 2445. The non-delegation overtones are not lost on us. Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (noting Congress “must provide substantial guidance on setting air standards that affect the entire national economy”).

121. Here is where we hesitate, because as a policy matter, we favor efforts to reduce GHG emissions.
sis,122 This surprising development highlights the importance of the issues we consider here; in particular, the Court’s order puts the burden of inertia on those who support the rule. In this Section, we consider what the Court did not: the interests at stake, how those bear on the standard for granting a stay, and the practical impacts of the stay. We also consider the matter of remedies should the Court ultimately decide the CPP is flawed in some way.

1. Early Issue Development

EPA, would-be-petitioners, and (in part) the D.C. Circuit itself have already put forth their positions regarding the interests at stake. After EPA announced the proposed rule in 2014, a coal company and various other parties benefited by coal mining or use, sought an extraordinary writ enjoining the CPP, arguing that the need to take substantial and costly steps toward compliance were already creating significant hardship.123 Acknowledging that “prudent organizations and individuals may alter their behavior (and thereby incur costs) based on what they think is likely to come,” the court rejected an invitation to become involved prior to the rule’s finalization.124 This outcome is typical. Extraordinary writs, which are to be issued sparingly,125 require: (1) no other adequate means of relief; (2) a clear and indisputable entitlement to relief; and (3) the court’s satisfaction that the writ is appropriate.126 Even though the final condition enables consideration of equitable factors, courts have resisted requests to issue writs founded on hardship in complying with the law.27

Similarly, shortly after the final rule’s announcement—but before its publication—another coalition of states sought another extraordinary writ, seeking a stay of the rule’s deadlines until litigation is complete.128 The CAA, however, specifies that petitions must be filed within sixty days of publication in the Federal Register.129 And in a terse two-paragraph order, the D.C. Circuit rejected the petition.130 Once again, when a regular appeals process is available, a court’s interest in proceeding according to the statutory scheme rather than granting an extraordinary writ will trump a petitioner’s cry of hardship.131

Though premature, this early activity provides a preview of some of the fairness and reliance issues raised by a rule of the

CPP’s magnitude. The state petitioners contended that relief was justified because the CPP gives states thirteen months from its announcement to submit their initial plans, rather than keying the deadline to the date of publication in the Federal Register.132 If petitioners were required to wait until the rules’ publication in the “normal course,” they were likely correct that any relief may not come until halfway through the states’ preparation time.133 The coal company petitioner put its irreparable injury argument simply, “The Final Rule is aimed squarely at coal.”134 After all, the petitioner argued, EPA’s own modeling suggests significant plant retirements in 2016.135 Because electricity companies must plan several years in advance, the petitioner argued that irrevocable closure decisions would be made years before litigation is complete.136

In response, EPA emphasized that the rule’s actual deadlines are 2018 and beyond; the initial state submittal in September 2016 is only a general statement of approaches under consideration, progress to date, and a description of opportunities for public input.137 Further, as described above, a state can even forgo developing a plan altogether.138 To the coal company’s argument of irreparable harm, EPA responded that—with emissions reductions not even slated to become effective until 2022—litigation would be complete well before that deadline.139 And EPA also underplayed its modeling, noting that while its final rule showed eleven gigawatts of coal-fired power ceasing by 2016, the model was meant to be illustrative rather than predictive.140

That last point underscores what is different about the CPP: both the type and degree of regulatory uncertainty during the litigation period are unprecedented. Regarding type, consider the discussion above, which emphasized that typical CAA regulations involve technology mandates.141 A regulated entity is likely to know years before such a mandate is finalized that it is under consideration; after all, many of the technology-based standards require some basis in existing technology.142 Prudent investors—who likely had a hand in developing the applicable standards—are likely to begin complying even during the pendency of litigation (notwithstanding their predictable cost-based

123. In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 339 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
127. In re Murray Energy, 788 F.3d at 335.
128. Emergency Petition for Extraordinary Writ, supra note 6. On August 5, 2015, several states also filed an application with EPA, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 705, requesting the Agency itself stay the rule's effective date of action. Id. at 4 n.2. EPA denied the request. Id.
131. See U.S. ex rel. Denholm & McKary Co. v. U.S. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 125 F.2d 557, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (“[T]he use of special writs to review . . . the action of . . . administrative bodies had its origins in the days of the stone age of administrative law” when regularized forms of appeal were lacking). The D.C. Circuit later denied the petitioners’ motion for stay once the CPP became final. In re West Virginia, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 2016).
132. Emergency Petition for Extraordinary Writ, supra note 6, at 1–2.
133. See id. at 3.
135. Id. at 24.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 26.
138. Id. at 28–29.
139. Id. at 29.
140. Id.
142. See Wendy E. Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 111 (2011) (“Industry enjoys a particularly privileged position in the development of rules because the air toxic emission standards because industry possesses a great deal of in-house information on industrial processes that EPA needs to write the rules.”).
resistance in the courts).143 Here, however, the building blocks and flexibility of the CPP do not mandate any particular technology.144 The scope of possibilities is so broad as to be overwhelming, and the only message of certainty is that EPA has taken aim at coal. It is perfectly logical, then, that new coal plants are unlikely to be built.145 And if—as building block 1 suggests—coal-fired generation is to be replaced with natural gas, at least some plant closures appear unavoidable.146 This observation points to the difference in degree of the CPP’s impact. Although typical environmental controls have indirect impacts on the electrical fuel mix by influencing the relative market price of power,147 the scope of the CPP is such that it will alter the design of the markets themselves.148

2. Preliminary Injunctive Relief

Given these significant concerns, it is unsettling that the Court provided no window into its rationale in granting a stay of the CPP during the pendency of litigation. The standard on a motion for preliminary injunction is equitable and requires a court to consider: (1) the petitioner’s likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the threat of irreparably injury absent the injunction; (3) the possibility of harm to others if the injunction is issued; and (4) the public interest.149 The discussion above illustrates the parties’ arguments—the petitioners contend that EPA lacks authority to issue the CPP (and to do so in the way it has), meaning there is a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the threat of irreparably injury if the court does not act; (3) the possibility of harm to others absent the injunction; (4) the public interest.150 This observation points to the difference in degree of the CPP’s impact. Although typical environmental controls have indirect impacts on the electrical fuel mix by influencing the relative market price of power,147 the scope of the CPP is such that it will alter the design of the markets themselves.148

EPA emphasizes the sheer magnitude of the climate change problem and the role of the rule in furthering the public interest as embodied in the CAA.

Without a quick ruling that the petitioners will likely succeed on the merits—which would have all but ended the litigation150—the real stake at this procedural stage is the rule’s momentum at the end of a presidential term. No doubt EPA would have preferred to keep the rule in force so that compliance could begin while President Obama is still in office. Even an injunction for a year forces the burden of inertia back to the status quo and buys time for the next administration to change its approach.151 This, of course, is the very risk with which we are concerned in the preceding Section; administrative law doctrine contemplates that agencies will change their approaches. When so much is at stake, that aspect of administrative law seems normatively flawed.

3. Remanding With or Without Vacatur

As we have noted, the variety of ways in which a court might find flaws in the CPP is staggering. For any of these defects, the APA provides that the reviewing court “shall” “set aside” the defective “agency action, findings, and conclusions.”152 Despite the mandatory wording, courts have never followed this language strictly; sometimes they vacate an agency’s decision,153 while other times they simply remand.154 Further, courts have applied both approaches to remedy the various types of defects we have identified.155

Doctrinal guidance on selecting the approach

150. Cases usually settle at this point. There is another important context in which the decision to issue a preliminary injunction has devastating effects. The Federal Trade Commission can obtain a preliminary injunction to stop a merger through use of a standard that is easier to meet than the standard applicable to the actions of other agencies. The issuance of the preliminary injunction is outcome-determinative because the proceeding to resolve the case on the merits takes so long that the parties to the merger have no choice but to capitulate. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Rocky Relationship Between the Federal Trade Commission and Administrative Law, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 2026, 2027, 2031 (2015).


154. Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 557 F.3d 165, 191 (9th Cir. 2009) (remanding worker safety standard but declining to vacate where “the only identified defect in a standard is the lack of an adequate statement of reasons”); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 251 F.3d 1026, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (remanding without vacating technical amendments to NOx State Implementation Plan Call; defect involved adopting new definition of electricity generating unit without providing notice and opportunity for comment).

155. For a discussion of how the remedy interacts with multiple requests of the same agency action, see generally Emily Hammond Meazzz, supra note 8.
is sparse, but the D.C. Circuit has articulated a balancing test that favors remands without vacatur by considering the “seriousness of the . . . deficiencies (and thus the extent of doubt whether the [A]gency chose correctly), the likelihood that the [A]gency will be able to correct the deficiencies on remand and the disruptive consequences of an interim change that may itself be changed.”

This standard reflects the reality that the practical import of the choice matters deeply: if the CPP is vacated, it is extinguished—as if the rule had never been promulgated. Not only does this result forestall the massive changes that might be embodied in state implementation plans, but it could eliminate that possibility altogether if the next administration chooses not to pursue a revision. If the CPP is remanded without vacatur, the rule remains in force—meaning regulated parties must comply. Of course, as discussed above, a new administration might direct EPA to change its policy under this scenario as well. But the inertia of compliance could be difficult to undo—particularly if the CPP was not stayed pending litigation.

Part of the lesson here is that the battles of the CPP—its statutory legitimacy and reasonableness in particular—will be won or lost not so much on the substance but on the remedial choices during and following litigation. We have described the balancing of interests relevant to whether a stay pending litigation should be granted, but it is critical to see that the impacts of that decision stand to be amplified in a court’s ultimate choice of remedy. Consider these scenarios, all of which would entail a flaw in reasoned decision-making (rather than a holding that EPA acted ultra vires). First, a court might grant a stay pending litigation, and remand with vacatur. This combination effectively kills compliance and returns the parties to the pre-CPP status quo. Second, a court might grant a stay pending litigation, but remand without vacatur. This combination provides a minor set-back in compliance, but permits substantial steps toward compliance thereafter (at the risk of a change in administration). Third, a court might decline to grant a stay pending litigation, but remand with vacatur. This approach would be wasteful in hindsight because states will have begun developing their compliance plans during the pendency of litigation, only to be relieved of the obligation to comply on remand. If the coal companies and coal-fired utilities are right about investors’ decisions, moreover, some of the coal fleet may be lost during this time. Finally, a court might decline to grant a stay pending litigation and remand without vacatur. This approach most fully moves compliance forward—which may result in changes that are irreversible as a practical matter, notwithstanding a change in administration.

Thus, the normative aspects of the ultimate choice of remedy bear consideration. The practice of remanding without vacatur has been criticized on statutory interpretation grounds; others have raised the normative concern that remands without vacatur are used inappropriately to soften the impact of hard-review. Other possible objections are that remanding without vacatur can undermine the constitutional underpinnings of the SEC v. Chenery Corp. doctrine by leaving in place a rule that cannot stand on an agency’s original reasoning. Still, many see the flexibility in determining a remedy as solidly grounded in Article III, pragmatic in promoting court-agency dialogue, and useful as a guard against ossification.

How does the CPP itself interact with these considerations? First, we expect judicial review in this case to fall on the rigorous end of the spectrum. Provided the flaws a court finds are remediable, remand without vacatur offers a counter-balance to searching review, albeit imperfectly. Further, the separation-of-powers concerns raised by both the CPP itself and judicial review of the Plan are heightened. As many have recognized, the CPP is a significant example of agency activity filling the vacuum left by a grid-locked Congress. This fact helps justify the extensive need


157. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. NRC, 988 F.2d 146, 150–51 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., supra note 46, at 75–76 (noting test favors remand without vacatur for reason to vacature decision-flaws because of likelihood that agencies can substantiate their decisions on remand).

158. Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (separate opinion of Silberman, J.) (agency must “initiate another rulemaking proceeding as if it would seek to confront the problem anew”).

159. Major rules promulgated under the CAA are notorious for EPA flip-flopping according to presidential policy (e.g., Chevron, NO. State Implementation Plan Call, Homer City (cross-state), and the MACTs).

160. Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 465. Moreover, subsequent judicial review will be confined to the matters addressed on remand. See generally Emily Hammond Meazell, supra note 8, at 1738 (discussing these distinctions).

161. See supra text accompanying notes in Part II.C.2.

162. See supra text accompanying notes in Part II.C.

163. For purposes of this discussion, we adopt the premise that *some* aspect of the CPP will fail the reasoned decision-making test. See Pierce, supra note 46, at 69 (stating, with respect to searches for flaws in agency’s reasoned decision-making, “[t]hat search will always bear fruit”). Of course, if a court holds EPA lacks statutory authority under the section 112 exemption or beyond-the-fence-line reasoning we have set forth supra Part II.C, the discussion here is moot.

164. Of course, this is the crux of the hardship prong of the preliminary injunction standard.

165. E.g., Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 491 (Randolph, J., dissenting) (“Setting aside means vacating; no other meaning is apparent.”).


168. Emily Hammond Meazell, supra note 8, at 1784.


for reason-giving that is embodied in the CAA as well as administrative law doctrine, and perhaps offers a reason to weigh our ossification concerns less heavily for this particular analysis. On the other hand, if the need for statutory and democratic legitimacy is at its highest when an agency’s action has such sweeping ramifications, then a flaw in reason-giving admittedly may justify vacatur as a check on agency behavior. Overall, we take a pragmatic view: vacating a remediable rule only reinforces instability and exacerbates the problems already noted with a *Chevron* approach to the interpretive issues. The reliability of our electricity system, and the impacts of climate change, are issues too serious to bear an on-again, off-again approach.

### III. Implementation Issues

Putting aside for now the doctrinal challenges for the CPP, we turn to two major implementation issues: (1) the challenges created by fuel-switching to intermittent sources; and (2) the limitations states may encounter as a result of retail or wholesale restructuring status. It seems possible that opponents of the CPP might argue that these issues render the CPP arbitrary and capricious, but our purpose is not to make those arguments. Rather, we raise our concerns as they relate to our views of energy policy and law more generally.

#### A. Challenges Created by Intermittent Sources

The largest reductions in GHG emissions expected as a result of implementation of the CPP are in building blocks 2 and 3. As described in Part I above, block 2 contemplates EGUs will switch first from coal to natural gas, which would achieve at least some reduction in GHG emissions. To achieve even further reductions, block 3 contemplates that EGUs will switch from fossil fuels to wind and solar. The good news is that the unit cost of producing electricity through use of some forms of wind and solar in some locations has declined significantly in recent years. The bad news is that both wind and solar are intermittent sources of electricity.

As Paul Joskow has explained in detail, intermittent sources of electricity are much less valuable than dispatchable sources—those that can be called upon to generate electricity at any time. Almost all EGUs that use fossil fuels are dispatchable, while no EGU that uses wind or solar is dispatchable. That distinction is important because of two basic characteristics of the electricity market. First, demand for electricity varies greatly every minute. Second, because electricity cannot be stored economically, it must be consumed at exactly the same time that it is generated. Those two characteristics underlie a market in which there must always be enough supply to meet current demand and in which electricity is much more valuable at times of peak demand than at times of low demand. By definition, dispatchable sources, including most EGUs that use fossil fuels, are available at times of peak demand. By contrast, the availability of electricity from the sun depends on whether the sun is shining and the availability of electricity from wind depends on whether the wind is blowing at a velocity that allows a particular wind turbine to turn at a particular speed.

The usefulness of an intermittent source depends on several variables. First, the availability factor of the source is important. “Availability factor” refers to the amount of time a source is able to produce electricity, divided by the amount of time in a given period. Fossil-fueled EGUs typically have much higher availability factors than wind and solar, due again to intermittency. Because intermittent sources may not be available when they are needed, their “load-serving capacity” is lower than that of fossil-fueled sources; that is, their nameplate capacities are derated to account for unavailability. Under this metric, wind’s load-serving capacity may be as low as ten percent of its nameplate capacity. Second, the correlation between the periods of time in which an intermittent source is available and the periods of time in which demand for electricity is high is an important determinant of the value of a source. The higher the correlation the more valuable the source. As would be expected, the correlation for dispatchable resources is much higher than that for non-dispatchable resources.

Third, the usefulness of any source depends on its location. A source that is close to major markets can be used more readily than a source that is farther from major markets, referred to as load centers in the electricity industry. There are two ways to measure the distance between a source and a load center. The first is to calculate the miles between a source and a load center. Using this measure a near source is available and the periods of time in which demand for electricity is high is an important determinant of the value of a source. The higher the correlation the more valuable the source. As would be expected, the correlation for dispatchable resources is much higher than that for non-dispatchable resources.

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175. This is the expectation for the CPP’s compliance period. As the CPP discusses, other low-carbon sources such as nuclear count toward compliance, but were not included in block 3 because of their longer construction times. *CPP supra* note 2, at 64,803.
178. For an overview, see Hammond & Spence, *supra* note 147, at 150.
182. Id. at 90.
183. Id. By contrast, the capacity factor reflects the amount of actual generation of a source over time divided by a source’s nameplate capacity. Data from the past several years show that capacity factors for fossil-fueled sources are higher than wind and much higher than solar, once again reflecting in part the ability of the source to generate over time. *Monthly Generator Capacity Factor Data Now Available by Fuel and Technology, U.S. Energy Info. Admin.* (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=14611. Capacity factors are also influenced by the type of load that the source serves (among many other things). Base load sources, like nuclear for example, have much higher capacity factors because they are nearly always running. See id.
greater the challenge of integration. The CPP is ambitious. It envisions a large increase in the proportion of the total electricity supply on each grid that will be provided by intermittent sources.

There are five predominant ways in which intermittent sources can be (or are) added to a grid at tolerable cost: storage, demand response, providing efficient backup supplies, increased access of intermittent sources to load centers, and geographic diversification of the intermittent sources that are accessible to each load center. Everyone agrees that electricity storage at reasonable cost is the ideal way to integrate intermittent sources. The massive research and development efforts that firms have devoted to attempts to further that goal have produced encouraging results, but making storage economical remains a challenge. For now, research and development efforts should continue to be prioritized.

Demand response is also a promising way to ameliorate intermittency and has already been used to this effect with some success. In addition to staying the CPP, the Supreme Court upheld the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC”) exercise of jurisdiction over demand response in the wholesale markets while this Article was going to print.

That opinion, styled FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n, held valid FERC Order 745, which sets a uniform pricing scheme for demand response in the wholesale markets. The decision is important because it clears the way for further experimentation with demand response, perhaps a silver lining to the stay of the CPP is the ability now to further demonstrate how demand response can complement renewables and help maintain the reliability of the electric grid.

Providing backup supplies is an additional means of integrating renewables. A useful low-carbon backup source for solar and wind is hydropower, if it is operated in storage mode—which emphasizes its value as a source of electricity and deemphasizes its value for competing purposes like irrigation, recreation, water quality maintenance, and support of aquatic species. If operated in this way, hydro is rampable; it can be turned on and off quickly just by opening

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185. See ISER, supra note 146, at 107–08 (describing security-constrained economic dispatch).

186. Hammond & Spence, supra note 147, at 150.


188. See Hammond & Spence, supra note 147, at 154–56 (discussing these considerations).

189. For a list of major blackouts, see CASAZZA & DELLEA, supra note 181, at 162.
and closing control gates.\footnote{199} Indeed, many European planners have already recognized this contribution of hydro, and contemplate that hydro will become increasingly important as renewables penetration increases.\footnote{200} When the sun stops shining or the wind stops blowing, Norway, for example, can make up for the sometimes large deficit in electricity supply that would otherwise exist in Germany or Denmark by sending large flows of electricity from hydropower to replace the electricity that was coming from solar and wind sources.\footnote{201}

Hydropower is unlikely to provide much of a solution to the integration problem in the United States for several reasons. First, the United States has access to only modest economically viable hydro supplies that are not already in full use for other purposes.\footnote{202} Second, the supply of hydropower is more likely to decline rather than to increase in the United States because dams are unpopular with the public.\footnote{203} Third, the United States takes seriously the competing uses of dams with access to greatly increased supplies of hydro.\footnote{204} so they are not nearly as reliable a source of backup power domestically as they are in northern Europe. Finally, hydropower’s availability is inversely proportional to drought conditions. California’s drought, for example, is responsible for a 9.7\% decrease in hydropower generation for 2015, contributing to a nationwide decrease in renewables generation of 2.7\%.\footnote{205} Some firms and government officials have recently shown interest in building more dams in western Canada to provide the United States with access to greatly increased supplies of hydro.\footnote{206} This is a promising development, but it is far too early to count on the success of such efforts in devising a plan to integrate intermittent sources in the U.S. grids.\footnote{207}

The CPP is predicated on the assumption that natural gas-fired EGUs will provide adequate backup power at times when demand is high but intermittent sources are not available. Indeed, natural gas is often touted as a fuel that can complement renewables’ intermittency.\footnote{208} This is because natural gas-fired EGUs can ramp quickly compared to other sources, so they are particularly useful for meeting demand when solar or wind cannot.\footnote{209} Natural gas-fired EGUs also have other characteristics that make them good candidates to provide backup power. The price of natural gas is low at present and is predicted to remain low for the foreseeable future. The capital cost of a natural gas-fired EGU is relatively low and the time required to obtain a construction permit is relatively short.\footnote{210}

Most important for purposes of furthering the goals of the CPP, the most efficient NGCC plants emit far less CO\textsubscript{2} than coal, as detailed in Part I. For that reason, the CPP is predicated on the assumption that natural gas-fired EGUs can be used both as a backup to the new solar and wind supplies that are expected to reduce emissions in block 3 of the CPP and, by replacing coal-fired EGUs, as the entire basis for the emissions reductions expected in block 2 of the CPP. Thus, the success of the CPP is critically dependent on maintaining and increasing the number and quantity of electricity generated by natural gas-fired EGUs at a tolerable cost.\footnote{211}

The assumption that natural gas-fired EGUs can perform both of those functions at tolerable cost is not well-supported. There are two obstacles to fulfilling that assumption. First, the cost per unit of electricity generated by natural gas-fired EGUs is likely to increase—perhaps significantly—as a result of the major changes in the use of natural gas-fired EGUs that are contemplated by the CPP. Traditionally, the most efficient natural gas-fired EGUs have been used primarily as baseload supply, i.e., they generate electricity at all times except when undergoing maintenance. The CPP is based on the assumption that over time the primary use of natural gas-fired EGUs will be as backup supplies. As electricity generated by solar and wind increases, therefore, the quantity of electricity generated by natural gas-fired EGUs will decrease.\footnote{212} In other words, natural gas will compete with renewables for baseload market share. That, in turn, will

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199. Hammond & Spence, supra note 147, at 164 n.107.
201. Id.
202. Cf. EIA Projections Show Hydro Growth Limited by Economics Not Resources, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 10, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=17051 (distinguishing studies suggesting greater technical capacity and noting, “Because hydropower is a mature technology, most of the technically and economically superior sites have already been developed.”).
207. One can imagine an approval process as heated as that involving the Keystone XL Pipeline; the relevant regulatory requirements and procedures are the same. See Exec. Order No. 12,038, 43 Fed. Reg. 4957 (Feb. 3, 1978) (transferring to the Department of Energy the authority to grant presidential permits for transmission lines and pipelines crossing international borders).
211. EPA envisions that at the short-term at least, combustion-turbine natural gas generation will be used as renewable support. CPP, supra note 2, at 64,716–17. These represent one-fifth of natural-gas-fired capacity, id. at 61,716, and in any event, are just as reliant on natural gas prices at NGCC.
212. At least, this is what the CPP seems to contemplate. Predictions of the future fuel mix are difficult to make even without the regulatory uncertainty imposed by the CPP attempts at modeling the proposed rule’s impacts to the generation mix resulted in projections that varied considerably. See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACTS OF THE CLEAN POWER PLAN 14–27 (2015), http://www.eia.gov/analysis/reports/powerplants/deanplant/pdf/powerplant.pdf (providing a summary of the results from projects of the new rule); Michael Wara et al., Peak Electricity and the Clean Power Plan, 28 ELECTRICITY J. 18, 24–25 (2015) (providing several predictions for electricity).
increase the cost of electricity per unit generated because the fixed costs of the EGU's will have to be recovered in the prices charged for a lower quantity of electricity generated.\textsuperscript{213}

The second obstacle to fulfilling the assumptions underlying the CPP is related to the first, but it is a much more serious obstacle. EPA assumes that the large increase in the amount of electricity generated through use of natural gas-fired EGU's can be met without constructing any new units.\textsuperscript{214} We are skeptical of that assumption. As EPA has stated in analogous contexts, its models should not be used as an indication of what is likely to happen but only as illustrations of what might happen.\textsuperscript{215} Under the CPP, many new natural gas-fired EGU's will have to be built to meet the increased need for electricity generated through use of natural gas that is part of the basis of both blocks 2 and 3 of the CPP. It will be challenging to finance those new natural gas generators in the dramatically different circumstances in which natural gas-fired EGU's will be used after the CPP is implemented.

Potential investors base their decisions on the flow of revenue expected as a result of an investment. In the case of a long-lived asset like an EGU, the relevant expected flow is over the expected life of the asset—thirty to forty years in the case of an EGU.\textsuperscript{216} The revenue flow expected from an investment in a natural gas-fired EGU in the conditions created by the CPP will be much lower than the flow expected from an investment in a natural gas-fired EGU that is used as a baseload source.\textsuperscript{217} Once natural gas-fired EGU's are used primarily as backups for wind and power, the expected revenue flow will be lower, and it will decline over time as the quantity of electricity expected to be generated from solar and wind increases.\textsuperscript{218} Moreover, the CPP may cause prospective investors to view investments in new natural gas-fired EGU's as high-risk. Since the purpose of the CPP is to reduce emissions of GHGs, and natural gas-fired EGU's emit large quantities of GHGs, prospective investors will be concerned that the CPP is only one step in the effort to reduce emissions of GHGs. Indeed, others have identified this issue as a policy imperative.\textsuperscript{219} The most logical step two would be a program to replace natural gas-fired EGU's with carbon-free sources. Thus, prospective investors will attach a high degree of uncertainty to the revenue flows they expect from an investment in a new EGU over the expected life of the EGU.

Low, declining, and uncertain expected revenue flows discourage investors. It is not at all clear that the conditions created by the CPP will be consistent with the investments in new natural gas-fired EGU's that we believe to be critical to the success of the CPP. If the market conditions do not produce enough investment, it is far from certain that the government will be willing to subsidize investments in new natural gas-fired EGU's, knowing that they are a significant source of GHG emissions. If enough new natural gas-fired EGU's can be financed in the conditions created by the CPP, the cost of the capital required to make those investments will be high, given the low, declining, and risky expected flow of revenues. That, coupled with the increased unit cost caused by the reductions in output of natural gas-fired EGU's, will make the critical gas components of the CPP costly.

The third way in which intermittent sources can be integrated at tolerable cost and with tolerable decreases in the reliability of electricity service is by maximizing the access of wind and power sources to major load centers. Many of the most desirable locations for wind farms and solar EGU's are remote from major load centers. For instance, the plains states have the kind of relatively high and constant wind velocity that make them particularly attractive locations for wind farms, while the deserts in the southwestern states have conditions that make them particularly attractive locations for solar EGU's.\textsuperscript{220} Both are far from major load centers, however.

The most desirable locations for wind and solar can be exploited only if they are connected to major load centers with new ultra-high voltage transmission lines. Professors Alexandra Klass and Elizabeth Wilson have explained in detail why that outcome is unlikely to happen in a timely manner without a major change in law.\textsuperscript{221} Most other important parts of the energy infrastructure, like gas pipelines and liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) plants, can begin construction as soon as they receive authorization from a federal agency.\textsuperscript{222} The process of obtaining that authorization takes an average of less than two years.\textsuperscript{223} But transmission lines can be constructed only if they are authorized by state, and sometimes even local, governments.\textsuperscript{224} The process of obtaining that authorization routinely takes a decade, often takes far longer, and sometimes proves to be impossible.\textsuperscript{225} The source of this problem is a mismatch between the geographic scope of the costs and benefits of transmission lines. A new transmission line usually produces some aesthetic harm and few benefits in the state that must authorize it. That state may come to the conclusion that the costs of the line to the state's residents exceed its benefits to the residents. It may then decide not to autho-

\textsuperscript{213} This potentially creates a situation similar to that currently being experienced by merchant nuclear power plants operating in wholesale markets; their short-run marginal costs are quite low, but their long-run-average costs are not compensated by the market because of various distortions. See generally Hammond & Spence, supra note 147 (providing this diagnosis).

\textsuperscript{214} CPP, supra note 2, at 64,802.

\textsuperscript{215} EPAs Response in Opposition, supra note 137, at 29.

\textsuperscript{216} See generally Levelized Cost and Levelized Avoided Cost of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2015, supra note 210 (describing these considerations).

\textsuperscript{217} A commentator to the proposed CPP argued that redirecting natural gas to supporting renewables calls into question EPA's anticipated seventy-five percent utilization rate of existing NGCC. CPP, supra note 2, at 64,803. Wrong source uploaded to portal. New source uploaded.e client, including name, however, as a practical matter the lawyer would p

\textsuperscript{218} See id.

\textsuperscript{219} See Mass. Inst. Tech., The Future of Natural Gas 9 (2010) (arguing higher GHG emission targets could “require the complete de-carbonization of the power sector”).


\textsuperscript{221} Id. at 1858–73.

\textsuperscript{222} See Alexandra B. Klass, Future-Proofing Energy Transport Law 20 (2015) (describing relative ease of authorizing this infrastructure) (unpublished manuscript) (draft on file with Authors).

\textsuperscript{223} Id. at 35.

\textsuperscript{224} Klass & Wilson, supra note 220, at 1830.

\textsuperscript{225} Klass, supra note 222, at 39.
rize construction of the line or, at least not to expedite the process of deciding whether to authorize the line. Viewed from a national perspective, however, the benefits of the line may be much greater than its costs. If a federal agency had the power to decide whether to authorize the line, it could make a quick affirmative decision. Given the importance to the success of the CPP of providing access to markets for solar EUGs and wind farms, a federal agency with the power to authorize construction of a transmission line would be able to match the two-year average time it now takes FERC to authorize construction of a gas pipeline or LNG plant.226

The final way in which intermittent sources can be integrated at tolerable cost and with a tolerable decrease in the reliability of electricity service is through geographic diversification of sources. A respected consulting firm has issued a report in which it concluded that the problem of integrating intermittent sources can be solved through geographic diversification of sources.227 That conclusion seems plausible. If a large number of wind and solar generators are connected in different locations, grid operators can maximize the probability that power will be available from some combination of intermittent sources at all times. When the wind decreases in one area, it is likely to increase in other areas, and a cloudy day in the location of some solar sources is likely to be offset by sunshine in the location of other sources or by healthy wind velocity in locations with wind farms. Denmark has made good use of this strategy, the key to its success has been the existence of a robust transmission grid.228

The United States is severely limited in its ability to use geographic diversification as a means of integrating intermittent sources. In most locations, the regional grids lack the capacity to transmit significant quantities of electricity generated from locations with differing weather conditions to load centers.229 To engage in effective geographic diversification of sources, the United States would have to strengthen the grids substantially by constructing many new transmission lines in a timely manner. That is impossible with our current allocation of permitting authority to state governments.

Absent some unexpected dramatic improvement in the ability to store electricity at tolerable cost or rapidly construct major transmission lines, integrating substantial intermittent sources as contemplated by the CPP will be difficult and expensive. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish that task successfully without a change in the allocation of power to authorize construction of transmission lines. If states retain that power, it is hard to imagine how the CPP can succeed. It follows that the two most important steps the United States must take to implement the CPP are continued aggressive research and development efforts to identify less expensive ways of storing electricity, and switching the power to authorize construction of a transmission line from state governments to the federal government.

B. The Interaction of Preemption Doctrine and State Electricity Regulation

As states consider how to implement the section 111(d) standards, they must also confront the many barriers stemming from our constitutional structure. For example, the electric Commerce Clause limits their options in designing renewable-portfolio or low-carbon fuel standards.230 The Supremacy Clause also limits state options, particularly with respect to the preemptive reach of the CAA,231 FPA,232 and Atomic Energy Act.233 An issue that has attracted little attention,234 however, concerns the interplay between a state’s restructuring status and preemption doctrine. Recent preemption litigation involving the FPA suggests that a state’s status matters for how it can comply with the CPP.

The relevant cases involve Maryland and New Jersey, which are restructured states operating in the PJM Interconnection. Both determined in the early 2000s that the PJM capacity market was not incentivizing sufficient investment in new electricity generation.235 New Jersey’s legislature, for

226. Courts have significantly limited FERC’s ability to carry out national transmission siting, notwithstanding that the Energy Policy Act of 2005 appeared to give FERC at least somewhat greater authority than it has traditionally had. See, e.g., Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the Department of Energy’s designation of National Interstate Electric Transmission Corridor); Piedmont Envr. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2009) (limiting FERC’s federal siting authority to circumstances in which states have failed to act, rather than denied, transmission construction certificates).


231. Cf. Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding CAA does not preempt state-tort putative class action involving coal-fired power plant’s ash and contaminants settling on landowners’ property).

232. E.g., Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988) (holding Supremacy Clause compelled Mississippi to permit utility to recover through its state rates, wholesale costs that FERC had determined were just and reasonable); cf. ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015) (holding Natural Gas Act provisions that are read in pari materia with FPA do not preempt state anti-trust claims against natural gas traders).


234. Cf. Hammond & Spence, supra note 147, at Part III.B (considering the issue as it relates to states’ abilities to incentivize particular electricity fuel sources).


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234. Cf. Hammond & Spence, supra note 147, at Part III.B (considering the issue as it relates to states’ abilities to incentivize particular electricity fuel sources).

example, expressly found that the capacity market had “not resulted in large additions of peaking facilities or any additions of intermediate or base load resources available to the region and the State.”236 The two states passed statutes that would subsidize new natural gas construction within their borders. Both accomplished this goal by assuring new generation a fixed revenue stream for supplying electrical capacity that cleared the PJM capacity market.237 Several existing electricity generators challenged the statutes, arguing they were preempted by the FPA.

Both the Third and Fourth Circuits held that field preemption forbade the statutes because the wholesale markets are within FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit decision in particular emphasized that by restructuring, Maryland had “throw[n] in its lot with the federal interstate markets” and thereby compelled electricity generators within its borders to sell electricity in the wholesale market.238 Having done so, the state could not then regulate how its generators interacted with that market—notwithstanding the states’ traditional authority over electricity siting and construction.239 The subsidy, reasoned the court, attempted to directly regulate capacity market prices by setting the price that generators would receive for capacity.240 This the state could not do.

These holdings are notable for two interrelated reasons. First, the markets themselves are frequently criticized for failing to incentivize new construction because they are based on short-run marginal costs but often include price caps.241 Capacity markets are one response; ERCOT’s very high price caps are another.242 Despite these modifications to the wholesale markets, commentators continue to express concern that there are inadequate incentives for investors.243 As described above, moreover, the CPP may heighten these concerns for natural gas.244

But to the extent states would step in to incentivize new capacity as part of their CPP compliance, the capacity cases show the options are limited. Indeed, the second reason to pay attention to these cases is that they show how restructured states may have less flexibility than their traditionally regulated counterparts. Compare, for example, Georgia and South Carolina, which are traditionally regulated states with vertically integrated utilities whose wholesale sales do not take place on spot markets. These states have incentivized new nuclear construction—which will count toward CPP compliance—by guaranteeing that the utilities can recover the carrying costs of construction through their rates.245 The capacity market issue is irrelevant in this context because these states have not disaggregated electricity generation from supply. Instead, the states are free to determine that new capacity is needed and to incentivize new construction through the rates they authorize.

And what of traditionally regulated states whose generators operate in a Regional Transmission Organization (“RTO”) or Independent System Operator (“ISO”) market?246 The logic of the capacity cases suggests that these states too are foreclosed from approaches like those Maryland and New Jersey took. And states that are traditionally regulated but in which generation resources operate in any RTO/ISOs or power pool face additional complexity. To be sure, the capacity cases noted that options like direct subsidies and tax rebates might avoid preemption concerns; these may be available under state law irrespective of restructuring status. Our point is not that states are left with no options. It is that those options are both variable and dependent on restructuring status. EPA glosses over state complexity by falling back on flexibility and the grid’s resiliency, but in doing so it fails to anticipate the ramifications of states’ restructuring decisions for CPP compliance.

IV. Conclusion

We end where we began. We support the CPP but we are concerned about the effects of some of the difficult legal issues it presents and some of the difficult implementation issues it presents. We cannot resist making one more point. It would be easy to accomplish all of the goals of the CPP more efficiently and effectively, with much lower transactions costs and much lower potential unintended adverse effects by taking just two steps. If the United States were to enact a carbon tax and switch to real-time pricing of electricity,247 then the United States could realistically expect that market forces would do the rest of the job.

245. For a full description, see Hammond & Spence, supra note 147, at Part II.C.1.
247. Kentucky is one such state, though it has a law forbidding mandated fuel switching or renewable additions for CPP compliance. See Jean Chemnick, Kentucky Regulators Walk Tightrope on Clean Power Plan, E&E News (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060014457.
249. The tax would need to be set at an optimal level; some authors have suggested about forty dollars per ton. See, e.g., Warwick J. McKibbin, Adelle C. Morris & Peter J. Wilcoxen, Brookings Inst., Controlling Carbon Emissions From U.S. Power Plants: How a Tradable Performance Standard Compares to a Carbon Tax (2015). Admittedly, tax policies suffer from regulatory fluctuation—an ill we have identified herein with respect to administrative law doctrine. E.g., Eisen et al., supra note 204, at 784–85 (“[T]he production tax credit’s record is a sad story of ‘Same Time, Next Year.’”).